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Appeal from the judgment of the Third District
Court for Salt Lake County,
Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD JACQUES, by and through
his guardian, ad litem, Pauline Murphy,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No.

DALLAS FARRIMOND, by and
through his guardian ad litem, Thomas
Smith Farrimond and THOMAS
SMITH FARRIMOND, personally,
Defendants-Respondents.

9724

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover damages for loss of eye,
kidney, one-half of his liver, and other serious personal
injuries by boy plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A jury in District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, awarded $20,000.00 general damages in a special verdict. District Judge A. H. Ellett entered a verdict
of "No Cause of Action" by reason of the jury answering "Yes" to a special interrogatory which asked, "Did
Richard Jacques voluntarily assume the risks incident
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to the manner in which Dallas Farrimond was driving the
car insofar as intoxication and wilful misconduct were
concerned?"
A motion for a new trial was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
1. That jury's verdict be reinstated, or in the alternative,
2. That plaintiff be granted a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richard Jacques, a 16 year old minor, was critically
injured on January 4, 1961 when the defendant, Dallas
Farrimond's, automobile, in which the plaintiff was riding in right rear seat as a guest, went out of control and
sheared off a utility pole near 2085 Viewmont Drive in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The vehicle was east
bound on Viewmont Drive when it went out of control
and skidded 124 feet, clipped a utility pole and then skidded sideways for an additional 67 feet. Farrimond, who
is usually a careful driver and well acquainted with the
area and road, never applied his brakes. (Tr. 184) The
plaintiff, Richard Jacques, was riding in the right rear
seat of the car which struck the pole and caused him to
suffer the following injuries:
a. Severe injury to his right side and both sides of
his chest.
b. Multiple severe scalp, face and eye lacerations,
with total destruction of his right eye by a laceration which passed through the eyeball.
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c. Severe contusions of right lung, with multiple
rib and costochondral fractures on both sides of
his chest, resulting in partial rotation of the sternum.
d. Fracture of right scapula .and left sternal clavical
joint.
e. Severe multiple lacerations of the right lobe of
the liver and colon.
f. Destruction of right kidney, necessitating removal.

g. Lacerations of right hand.
h. Cerebral concussion.
The pertinent events leading up to a catastrophic
collision commenced about 7: 15 P.M. when the defendant, Dallas Farrimond, drove his 1955 Buick Super automobile to the plaintiff's home to pick him up. Immediately thereafter, Dwight Tolley, Dick Gorringe, Richard Rhead and George Ligeros were called for and Farrimond drove to the House of Pizza which is situated at
21st South and 9th East. Farrimond, Jacques, Rhead and
Tolley all testified there was no drinking by Farrimond
until he reached the House of Pizza and plaintiff's attorney made no claim to his prior drinking. (Tr. 245, Tr
177) At approximately 9:30P.M., George Ligeros was
given a bottle of gin which had two or three inches of gin
in the bottom. Farrimond testified that Ligeros brought
the gin out to his car where it was mixed with 76 mixer
and consumed by Ligeros, Jacques and himself. The plaintiff, Jacques, denied drinking. The collision occurred at
approximately 10:00 P.M.
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Defendant Farrimond further testified that he met
Arlene Huntzinger at the House of Pizza and was quite
upset over the fact that she had driven there in another
man's car; (Tr. 156, Tr 179) and further infuriated when
told she expected to marry another man. (Tr 364) While
this episode was going on, the other boys were outside
engaged in a dough fight. Jacques had no knowledge
whatsoever of any dispute between Farrimond and his
girl friend. It was agreed that Farrimond was usually
a careful driver. Arlene Huntzinger, his girl friend, left
the House of Pizza first then Farrimond decided to go
out to her home. Farrimond testified that the boys got
in his car and drove down 9th East to 39th South, up
39th South to 13th East, out 13th East to 48th South, up
48th South to Viewmont Drive and southeast on Viewmont Drive to point of collision, which was within a
hundred or so feet from the Huntzinger home. It is undisputed that Farrimond drove at excessive rates of speed
(Tr 365) on 9th East. It is also undisputed that he favorably responded to protests made by (Tr 365, Tr 151)
the guests and drove more carefully up to the time he
commenced speeding down Viewmont Drive. (Tr 183, Tr
186, Tr 187, Tr 222) At this point Richard Rhead said,
"Dallas, you won't make this corner going this fast." Farrimond disregarded the warning and the collision ensued.
Farrimond admitted he was well-acquainted with the
road (Tr 184) and the general area and had travelled
it many times before.
ARGUMENT
POINT NUMBER ONE:
The trial court erred in formulating the special ver-
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diet by requiring jury to find conclusions of law rather
than ultimate conclusions of fact.
POINT NUMBER TWO:
The trial court erred not finding as a matter of law
in this case that the defense of assumption of risk cannot
be used against wilful misconduct.
POINT NUMBER THREE:
The trial court erred in instructing on negligence
and contributory negligence when these matters were not
in issue.
POINT NUMBER ONE: Examination of the interrogatories in the special verdict which was given to the
jury by the court reveals the following matters: (Tr 81)
Question No. 1: Was Dallas Farrimond intoxicated immediately prior to the collision? Answer. Yes.
This was a question which would require an ultimate
fact which could properly be answered by the jury. The court continued - If so, was the intoxication a proximate cause of the collision? Answer. Yes.
The question of proximate cause will be reserved
for a later argument and included in our general article.
Question No. 2. Immediately prior to the collision,
was Dallas Farrimond guilty of wilful misconduct? Answer. Yes.
If so, was such wilful misconduct a proximate cause
of the collision? Answer. Yes.
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Question No. 3. During the trip and immediately
prior to the collision, did Richard Jacques voluntarily
assume the risks in the manner in which Dallas Farrimond driving the car in so far as the intoxication and
wilful misconduct is concerned? Answer. Yes.
Question No. 4. During the trip immediately prior
to the collision, did Richard Jacques encourage Dallas
Farrimond to drive at an excessive rate of speed? Answer.
No.
Question No. 5. Showing by the preponderance of
the evidence of the case, what amount of money would
fairly and adequately recompense Richard Jacques for
any and all damages he has sustained as a result of the
collision? (See Instruction No. 19.)
Answer. $20,000.00.
It is the appellant's contention in this case that the
two questions, one regarding wilful misconduct and the
other regarding assumption of risk were in effect submitting to the jury a requirement of them to answer questions of law rather than ultimate questions of fact. The
function of a special verdict with its interrogatories is to
obviate sympathy verdicts in personal injury cases but in
endeavoring to do away with said sympathy verdicts, the
questions themselves should not become so onerous, so
involved, so oppressive that the function itself is lost sight
of and the reverse of what is intended happens and that
justice itself is lost by the use of said special verdicts. It
is admitted that it throws an unduly oppressive burden
on the jury, even with instructions, to make definitive answers in connection with complex concepts of the law
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such as wilful misconduct and assumption of risk where
the courts themselves are, to a large extent, in a quandry
as to exactly what they mean. There are extensive annotations in the American Law Reports on both issues that the
fact that the jury was being confused by both of the concepts is indicated by these portions of the record:
On page 452 of the record at line 6, the court says:
"I was about to call you in to talk to you about going to
dinner. The bailiff suggested that you may have some
questions. You can be seated if you wish to. Do you have
a question that you would like to talk to me about?"
Then the court proceeds to answer the question
made by the foreman of the jury, Mr. Alder, on line 24,
as follows:
"MR. ALDER: We want to know about misconduct,
the amount - whether a person voluntarily speeds is
guilty of misconduct?"
Then we have an elaborate explanation by the court
on line 18 of page 453 where the court proceeds to explain wanton misconduct:
"MRS. SAVILLE : Is wilful misconduct almost the
same as wilfully wanting to kill somebody?"
Then there is another explanation of the court; that
it doesn't mean exactly to kill someone; and so the colloquy proceeds, indicating that the jury is hopelessly lost
in a maze of legal technicalities in connection with the
concept of wilful misconduct.
With regard to the concept of assumption of risk, we
find in the record on page 45 7 the following questions and
answers : line 18.
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"No. III. During the trip and immediately prior to
the collision did Richard Jacques voluntarily assume the
risks incident to the manner in which Dallas Farrimond
was driving the car insofar as intoxication and wilful misconduct were concerned?" The answer is "Yes."
That is signed by Mrs. Saville, Mr. Shaw, Mr. Wilhelmsen, Mr. Driscoll, Mr. England, Mr. Pack, and Mr.
Jackson. Let's see. Mr. Alder did not sign that. Beg pardon?
MR. ALDER: That may have been unintentional.
THE COURT: Did you mean to sign that?
MR. ALDER: Read that again.
THE COURT: "During the trip and immediately
prior to the collision did Richard Jacques voluntarily assume the risks incident ·to the manner in which Dallas
Farrimond was driving the car insofar as intoxication
and wilful misconduct were concerned?"
MR. ALDER: We discussed that quite a bit, Judge,
and we figured that he was not compelled to ride in that
car, and in that way he was assuming the risk. Now, you
can put my name on that if that isTHE COURT: No, you will have to put your own.
If under my instructions you think that he with knowledge
of this trouble rode in that car, then he did assume the
risk.
~1R.

ALDER: No one knew at that time when he
was in the car that they \vere going to be in the wreck,
but he was riding in the car wilfully and not being compelled is the way they decided this.
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THE COURT: Of course, you can't explain your
verdict after you are out. There can't be any explanations,
but if there is any question, I want you to read my
instruction on that.
Court proceeds to read his instruction.
Now it is true that the deliberations of the jury in
connection with how they arrived at their verdict may
not be a proper matter for the record, but it is a proper
matter of the record for the Supreme Court of Utah
to determine the confusion that is extant in the minds
of the jury when they are actually called upon to
determine questions of law riding under the guise of
ultimate questions of fact.
It is further significant and interesting to note that
the eagerness of the jury to please the trial judge, and
the record reveals the friendliness of the trial judge with
the jury; and it might be added as a sidenote that it is
the function of a trial court to formally present the law
to the jury, and that is all; and it is the function of the
jury not to try to determine which way the judge is
thinking concerning the facts, but to make the finding
of fact themselves objectively.
POINT NUMBER TWO: So far as we can determine, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has
not determined the precise issue of whether assumption
of risk can be used as a defense against- wilful misconduct.
It is alluded to in Ferguson vs. ]ongsma 10 Utah 2nd
179. In that case, the distinction was made between
contributory negligence and assumption of risk at page
190 it states that: "Contributory negligence is based
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upon carelessness, inadvertence and unintended risk but
assumption of risk requires an intelligent and deliberate
choice to assume a known risk. Assumption of risk requires knowledge by plaintiff of a specific defect or
dangerous condition caused by the defendants negligence
or lacking of due care which the plaintiff could have
voluntarily and deliberately avoided and thereby assumed
the risks of injuries he sustained. On the other hand,
contributory negligence requires evidence only that plaintiff failed to use the care for his own safety which an
ordinary reasonable and prudent person could use under
the existing circumstances.''
In Milligan vs. Harwood 11 Utah 7 2nd 74 with
regards to intoxication, it is stated on page 76: "Of
course if the plaintiff would have known Harwood was
intoxicated at the time they embarked on the journey,
he would probably be in the position of having assumed
the risk."
In the main annotation on this subject in American
Law Reports, 44 ALR 2nd 1342, CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE, ASSUMPTION OF RISK, OR RELATED DEFENSES AS AVAILABLE IN ACTION
BASED ON AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE OR
SIMILAR COMl\10N-LAW RULE, at page 1347 Section 3, ASSUMPTION OF RISK:
"In jurisdictions which recognize a rule of assumption of risk as distinct from the defense of contributory
negligence, it has usually been held that this defense
is available to an automobile host charged with wilful
or wanton misconduct or recklessness, even though the
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guest's contributory negligence might not bar his recovery." Citing California, Colorado, Connecticut and
Florida cases and others.
It is further stated on page 134 7 supra: "Asserting that the doctrine of assumption of risk was not
restricted to cases where there was a contract relationship
between the parties, and that, under certain circumstances, it might operate in the field of negligence, the
court in Freedman v. Hurwitz ( 1933) 116 Conn 283, 164
A 647, said that when so applicable in negligence actions
the principle was distinct from that of contributory
negligence, and that therefore the fact that contributory
negligence was not a defense to an action under the
guest statute did not in itself prevent the defense of
asssumption of risk in a proper case. The court went
on to say, however, that the doctrine operated in a
strictly limited field, since it must tbe shown, in order
to bar recovery thereunder, that the injured person had
known or ought reasonably to have perceived that the
risk existed and that unless he took steps to protect
himself he would be liable to injury, and that the incurring of the risk must be really voluntary."

See also the Restatement of Torts Sec. 482 and 503
( 2) which provides that pl¥Lintiffs contributory negligence shall not bar recovery from harm caused by the
defendants reckless disregard for plaintiffs safety, but
that a plaintiff is barred from recovery from harm
caused by defendants reckless misconduct if knowing
of such misconduct and the danger to himself involved
therein, the plaintiff recklessly exposes himself thereto
(emphasis ours). This comment points out that the plain-
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tiff is not barred by failure to exercise reasonable care
after knowing that the recklessness conduct and the
dangers involved therein. Now even by that form of
negligence known as voluntarily assumption of risk, but
only 'vhere he only knows of the reckless misconduct, but
also realizes the gravity of the risk involved so that he
is not only unreasonably, but recklessly exposing himself.
So it will be seen, then, that the doctrine enunciated
in the American Law reports that the assumption of
risk is a defense to wilful misconduct involves a particular and peculiar type of assumption of risk and that
is where the conduct of the plaintiff himself equals or
exceeds an indifference of recklessness or wanton conduct of the defendant. It will also be seen that it was
the plaintiff's contention statement of facts that first:
the defendant was intoxicated, which wasn't apparent
to the plaintiff or to any of the others, and secondly, that
the defendant had that night a personal clash with his
girl friend and that he was in the process of trying
to reach her home in the fastest way possible with the
utmost disregard for the safety of his guests. Therefore,
under the statement of facts that the most favorable view
that the reviewing court could take in favor of the
defendant that it was apparent that none of the guests
in that automobile could have known of either (a) the
intoxication of the defendant, or (b) his reckless state
of mind existing, because of his argument with his girl
friend.
POINT NUMBER THREE: To add to the welter
of blundering confusion created by the trial court in
this matter, the trial court pre-emptorily and in dis-
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regard of a ruling by the judge at the pretrial - arbitrarily ruled and instructed upon negligence, contributory negligence, reasonable care, due care, ordinary
care, all of which had no issue or bearing on the case
which in turn added to the already confused minds of
the jury. (Tr. 74)
CONCLUSION
It will be seen from a review of the facts of law in
this case that special scrutiny and attention must be
paid to the whole concept of special verdicts. While it
is true that the primary function is to have them determine the operative facts upon which the court can then
draw legal conclusions in order to avoid sympathy
verdicts, at the same time, it can be a double edged
sword and the function and purpose for what it was
devised can be a cutting tool to severe justice itself. It
can become a tool to use to bewilder the minds of the
jury with the end result is that it accomplishes the
opposite of what it intends to do.

We submit that in the instant case that this is
exactly what happened and therefore respectfully request
that the decision be reversed and that the appellant
herein be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN E. STONE
MARK S. MINER
816 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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